An Equilibrium Model of Lumpy Housing Investment by Matteo Iacoviello & Marina Pavan
An Equilibrium Model of Lumpy
Housing Investment
Matteo Iacoviello - Marina Pavan*
Boston College The Geary Institute,
University College Dublin
We  formulate and solve a dynamic general equilibrium model
with heterogeneous agents and lumpy housing adjustment at the
household level. We use the model to ask a simple question: how
does the microeconomic lumpiness of housing adjustment affect the
equilibrium dynamic properties of aggregate consumption and invest-
ment? Our main conclusion is that lumpiness matters: in particular,
lumpiness in housing adjustment (1) reduces the volatility of both
housing and business investment; (2) increases the volatility of
aggregate consumption; (3) increases the correlation of housing
investment with business investment and with GDP. We also show
that lumpiness of investment activity at the household level has small
but significant aggregate implications, in contrast with the literature
that shows that the aggregate effects of lumpy investment at the firm
level are negligible. [JEL Classification: E21, E32, E44, D91]
In questo articolo, formuliamo e risolviamo un modello di-
namico di equilibrio generale con agenti eterogenei e costi nell’ag-
giustamento dei beni durevoli (case) da parte delle famiglie. Il mod-
ello viene utilizzato per analizzare gli effetti di tali costi sulle di-
namiche macroeconomiche di consumo, investimento delle famiglie
(case) e investimento delle imprese. Simulazioni del modello mo-
strano che questi costi sono importanti, in quanto: (1) riducono
la volatilità dell’investimento sia delle famiglie che delle imprese;
(2) accrescono la volatilità del consumo totale; (3) fanno aumentare
la correlazione dell’investimento nel settore delle case sia con l’in-
vestimento delle imprese che con il PIL.
1. - Introduction
In this paper, we formulate and solve a dynamic general
equilibrium model of housing investment in which housing
15
SAGGIO AD INVITO
* <iacoviel@bc.edu>; <marina.pavan@ucd.ie>. The Authors are grateful to Mas-
simo Giovannini and Joachim Goeschel for their invaluable research assistance.investment is lumpy at the household level. The model feature that
contributes to make housing investment lumpy are non-convex
transaction costs for housing adjustment. In all other respects, our
economy is a simple extension of an otherwise standard hetero-
geneous-agents, incomplete markets, real business cycle model with
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks in the tradition of papers like
Krusell and Smith (1998), Chang and Kim (2007), and Silos (2007).
Our main interest is in understanding how the business cycle
properties of the model are affected by the presence of housing
when housing adjustment becomes lumpy. In broader terms, we
study the implications for aggregate dynamics of an economy in
which individuals can accumulate assets characterized by different
degrees of liquidity. The agents of our model can hold two assets:
capital and housing. Capital can be easily acquired and sold in
the market; instead, houses are assets with a limited amount of
liquidity: they can be purchased, accumulated or sold, but only
subject to various transaction costs.
We characterize stochastic stationary equilibria of our models
numerically, and then compare their aggregate properties. Our
main results are as follows. Relative to a reference model without
lumpy housing adjustment, the model with lumpy housing has the
following properties:
1. Because housing wealth is more illiquid, individuals prefer
to hold a larger buffer stock of resources when they cannot easily
adjust their housing positions. Therefore average savings are
higher and the average interest rate is lower in the lumpy housing
economy. Relative to an economy without adjustment costs,
individuals tend to hold more capital and less homes when homes
become more illiquid.
2. Because housing wealth cannot be easily adjusted in response
to aggregate and individual shocks, households have fewer
adjustment margins in order to smooth fluctuations in non-durable
consumption. Hence aggregate and individual consumption are
more volatile when housing is lumpy and more illiquid.
3. With lumpy housing, aggregate consumption is more
volatile, whereas aggregate housing and non-housing investment
are less volatile. Overall, the volatility of total GDP is smaller.
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162. - Facts about (Lumpy) Housing
Our interest is in developing a realistic model of lumpiness
in housing adjustment where lumpiness stems from transaction
costs associated with changing housing consumption.
1 Our
notion of realism is a model that is roughly in line with aggregate
data on housing and the macroeconomy. For this reason, data
from the National Income and Product Accounts of the United
States (henceforth NIPA) are our preferred way of measuring the
various transaction costs associated with adjusting housing
consumption. Below, we review some facts about housing that
guide the formulation, calibration and evaluation of our model.
Moving and Transaction Costs. From the old saying that Rome
wasn’t built in a day to the wealth of available empirical evidence
that suggests that households move home only infrequently,
several pieces of evidence point out to the fact that, when
households adjust their housing consumption, they often do so
only by paying substantial transaction costs. Quigley (2002)
reviews the different forms that these transaction costs take. These
costs include the direct costs of moving, the search costs of finding
a new home, the costs of matching a borrower with a lender, the
legal and administrative costs of closing the sale of a home, and
the psychic costs of moving. Ghent (2007) surveys the empirical
evidence: her numbers suggest that the transaction costs
associated with changing housing consumption, whenever the
change takes the form of a move, range around 5 to 10 percent
of the value of the house.
Renovation Costs. Households can adjust their housing
consumption in continuous amounts by letting their home
depreciate (for instance, by not undergoing repair and maintenance),
or by making some home improvements which add value to the
existing stock (for instance, adding a new heating system, remodeling
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1 We  define lumpy as large and infrequent. This behavior can be easily
reconciled with non-convex transaction costs of housing adjustment. Of course,
information processing costs, life-cycle motives and other frictions might also
contribute to make investment in housing lumpy at the micro level (even in absence
of non-convex transaction costs). We do not explore these possibilities here.a bathroom, painting the walls — activities that are counted as
residential investment in GDP). Typically, improvements and
renovations add value to the home in a one for one fashion, although
anecdotal evidence suggests that the price of a home improvement
project may not always be recouped. For instance, Remodelling
Magazine “Cost vs. Value Report,” estimates that home remodelling
projects typically recoup about 80 percent of the cost.
2
Housing and Housing Transaction Costs in National Income
and Product Accounts. Housing contributes to the nation’s gross
domestic product in two basic ways: directly, through residential
fixed investment, and indirectly, through consumption spending
on housing services. Residential investment accounts for 5 percent
of GDP, housing consumption for 10 percent of GDP. For this
reason, the housing sector accounts for roughly 15 percent of a
nation’s gross domestic product.
Residential investment includes construction of new single-
family and multi-family structures, residential remodelling,
production of manufactured homes, and brokers’ fees. Consumption
spending on housing services includes rents paid by tenants and
the imputed value of housing services to home owners.
The United States National Income and Product Accounts
break residential investment down into various sub-categories. The
major component counts the value of new additions to the existing
housing stock: this is called “permanent site” residential
investment, and accounts for roughly two thirds of total residential
investment. In addition to this category, home improvements
account for about 20 percent, and brokers’ commissions account
for about 10 to 15 percent.
Each year, brokers’ commissions on the sales of new and
existing homes are counted as part of a nation’s gross domestic
product in the residential fixed investment category. In 2005, for
instance, total brokers’ commissions were 87 billion dollars, about
15 percent of total residential fixed investment (slightly less than 1
percent of total GDP in the US). In practice, these brokers’
commissions are indirectly calculated imputing a commission on
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2 The report was published by Hanley-Wood LLC in 2002.the total value of home sales in a particular year. In 2005, the value
of existing home sales was 1,279 billion dollars, the value of new
home sales was 307 billion dollars. Given a total value of 1,784
billion dollars, brokers’ commissions amount to roughly 87/1784  
5% of the value of transactions. This number would imply a market
price of 5 percent in computing the transaction costs associated
with changing housing consumption. We use the italic above
because our reading of several pieces of information, however,
suggests that the 5 percent rule might exaggerate the average market
price of buying and selling a home. First, brokers’ commissions are
not computed using independent information; instead, they are
calculated under the assumption that these commissions are 6
percent of the value of existing home sales and 4 percent of new
home sales. However, Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) data on
income of real estate brokers’ do not match up with Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) data: according to the BLS, there are
about 432,000 real estate sales agents in the United States, and each
made on average an income of 40,000 dollars in 2005.
3 If these
numbers are correct, totals brokers’ income is 17 billion dollars,
that is 5 times smaller than the figure imputed from the BEA.
4
Summary. We conclude this brief and selected survey by
summarizing that: (1) large changes in housing consumption
involve large transaction costs, since they are typically associated
with a move that involves selling an old home and buying a new
one; (2) small changes in housing consumption do not involve major
transaction costs, since the cost of renovations is often recouped;
(3) the cost of large changes is typically linear in the value of the
house: the total (non-market and market) transaction cost is around
10 percent; the market transaction cost (which excludes the time
spent searching a new house, the emotional distress associated with
a move, and so on) is smaller, probably in the 3 to 6 percent range.
We use the numbers above as an input in the calibration of our
model. Before doing so, we present our setup in the next section.
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3 See http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos120.htm.
4 Under the assumption that half of the agents’ commission goes to the firm
they work for, commissions calculated by BEA in the National Income and Product
Accounts are still 2.5 times larger than those produced by the BLS statistics.3. - The Model Economy
Our benchmark economy is a version of the stochastic growth
model with heterogeneous consumers, extended to allow for housing
investment, collateralized borrowing and housing adjustment costs.
There is a continuum of infinitely lived agents who have an
exogenously specified stochastic endowment process. Time is
discrete. Each consumer has preferences over a non-durable
consumption good, durable housing and leisure.
At each point in time, agents differ in two respects:
1. Their realized labour productivity;
2. Their degree of patience: a recent branch of this literature
suggests that preference heterogeneity may be an important source
of wealth inequality. This is motivated by the finding that similar
households hold very different amounts of wealth. For example,
Venti and Wise (2001) study wealth inequality at the outset of
retirement among households with similar lifetime earnings and
conclude that “the bulk of the dispersion must be attributed to
differences in the amount that households choose to save”.
5
There are no state contingent markets for hedging against
idiosyncratic risk, and only self-insurance through a risk-free bond
is possible. Agents can borrow up to a fraction of their housing
wealth, and incur a cost in adjusting the housing stock. Finally,
aggregate uncertainty is introduced in the form of a shock to total
factor productivity. Hence the model uses as inputs the exogenous
aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty, and delivers as output the
endogenously derived dynamics of housing and financial investments
over the business cycle.
3.1 The Household Problem
Let l
–
denote each agents’ total time endowment. Households
derive utility from leisure (l
–
– l), non-durable consumption c, and
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5 KRUSELL P. - SMITH A.A.J. (1998) also explore a heterogeneous-agents setting
with preference heterogeneity which, unlike a benchmark model with a single
discount factor, replicates some of the key features of the observed data on the
distribution of wealth.service flows from housing, which are assumed to be proportional
to the stock h.
They maximize their expected lifetime utility
6
where βi is the household specific discount factor, βi ∈ (0, 1), and
E0 denotes expectations at t = 0. We refer to households with a
lower value of β as impatient. The discount factor is deterministic,
and does not vary over time. In the numerical experiments below,
we assume that households are either born impatient or patient.
Heterogeneity in discount factors allows the model matching the
wealth distribution better than in a model without these features.
The per-period utility function is additively separable in its
arguments, and takes the following logarithmic formulation:
with j, τ > 0.
Each unit of time endowment supplied in the labor market is
paid at the wage rate wt. At each t, households receive a shock to
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6 Throughout the paper, lowercase variables refer to individual variables,
uppercase variables to aggregate variables.a law of large numbers, at each period there are ∏(z) agents
characterized by labour productivity z. The total amount of labour
efficiency units
is constant and normalized to one for convenience.
Households can buy and sell only one bond, b, which pays a
gross risk-free interest rate of Rt in period t. For convenience, let
positive amounts of this bond denote a net debt position.
7 Housing
wealth can be used as collateral for borrowing. At any period, the
maximum net debt that households can incur is a fraction m of
the housing stock:
It is implicit here that there exists an intermediary financial
sector which collects deposits from some households, and lends
both to other households and to firms.
Each agent starts out with initial conditions (b0,  h0). Given
that there are no state contingent markets for the individual
shocks, the agent is able to smooth consumption only by adjusting
the level of financial stock and housing stock over time.
3.2 The Environment
The goods market is perfectly competitive and characterized
by constant returns to scale, so that without loss of generality we
can consider a single, representative firm only. The good is
produced according to the Cobb-Douglas technology:
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7 We therefore refer to b as financial liabilities (or net debt), and correspondingly
to –b as financial assets (or net assets).where  L and  K denote aggregate labour and aggregate capital
respectively, α∈(0, 1) is the capital share of aggregate income,




α} represents the stochastic shock to total
factor productivity. The aggregate shock is assumed to follow a
finite-state Markov process with transition matrix πA,A' = Pr (At+1
= A'/At = A), with πA,A' > 0 for every A, A' ∈ A
~
, and
for every A ∈ A
~
.
We identify higher or lower aggregate productivity with booms
and recessions over the business cycle, and we will analyze the
cyclical properties of housing and financial investment.
The economy-wide feasibility constraint requires that at each
period t total production of the good, Yt, corresponds to the sum
of aggregate consumption Ct, investment in the stock of aggregate
capital Kt, investment in the stock of aggregate housing Ht, and
the total transaction costs incurred for adjustments to the housing
stock, Ω (Ht, Ht–1):
(1)
with  δH and  δK denoting the depreciation rates of housing and
capital, respectively.
We assume that there is no government, nor supply or demand
of bonds from abroad. Hence the net supply of financial assets in
this economy must be equal to the aggregate level of physical
capital, Kt. Factor prices will be determined in equilibrium by the
optimization conditions of the representative firm, which
maximizes its profits.
3.3 The Equilibrium
Denote with Φt (zt, bt–1, ht–1; β) the distribution over productivity
shocks, asset holdings, housing wealth, and discount factors in
CH H H H K K Y
tt H t t t t K t +− − + +− − =
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8 Without aggregate uncertainty, the economy would be in
a stationary equilibrium, with an invariant distribution Φ and
constant prices. Given aggregate volatility however, the distribution
Φ will change over time, depending on the evolution of aggregate
shocks and the heterogeneity of individual states at any period.
When solving their dynamic optimization problem, agents need
to predict the future wage and interest rate. The latter depend on
the future productivity shock and aggregate capital-labour ratio,
which in turn is determined by the overall distribution of individual
states.
9 As a consequence, the distribution Φt (zt, bt–1, ht–1; β) (and
its law of motion) is one of the aggregate state variables agents need
to know in order to make their decisions (together with total factor
productivity). This distribution is an infinite-dimensional object,
and its law of motion maps an infinite-dimensional space into itself,
which imposes a crucial complication for the solution of the model
economy. Indeed, it is impossible to directly compute the
equilibrium for such an economy. We thus adopt the computational
strategy of Krusell and Smith (1998) and assume that only the first
moments of the distribution Φ are sufficient to forecast future
prices. Krusell and Smith’s approach can be seen as a mere
computational device to solve for an “approximate” equilibrium in
this kind of models. In a different interpretation, agents could be
thought of as having “partial information”, or being characterized
by “bounded rationality”. In any case, Krusell and Smith (1998)
show that their methodology is accurate enough so to have very
small forecasting errors and an “approximate” equilibrium that is
very close to the exact one.
We can write the household problem in recursive formulation.
The agent’s individual state variables are the productivity shock zt,
the net liabilities position bt–1, and the stock of housing wealth
ht–1 owned at the beginning of period t. In the spirit of Krusell
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8 The marginal distribution of Φt with respect to zt is Π, by definition.
9 In an economy with heterogeneous agents, people have different incomes
and different propensities to save out of their wealth, so that the entire wealth
distribution (together with the optimal policy functions) is needed to predict the
future aggregate capital-labour ratio, and thus the interest rate such that firms’
profits are maximized.and Smith (1998), agents need only forecast future aggregate
capital stock and aggregate housing stock in order to predict the
next period’ wage and interest rate. They observe aggregate
housing wealth Ht–1 and aggregate capital Kt–1 at the beginning of
period t, and approximate the evolution of each of these variables
and of aggregate labour with a linear function that depends on
the aggregate shock At. Denote with xt   (zt, bt–1, ht–1, At, Kt–1, Ht–1)
the vector of individual and aggregate state variables.
10 In
recursive form, the dynamic problem of a household with discount
factor βi can be stated as follows:
(2)
where  F is a linear function in Kt–1 and  Ht–1, whose parameters
depend on the aggregate shock At, and denotes the law of motion
of the aggregate states, which agents take as given. The agent
sustains an additional cost, proportional to his initial housing
stock, only if the adjustment in housing is big enough:
with ψ,φh∈(0,1). No expense is incurred if the proportional change
in housing is lower than φh. In the discussion below, we will
present results for alternative calibrated values of the parameters
and ψ andφh.
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10 We present the “approximate” recursive formulation in which the aggregate
state variables are represented by the economy capital and housing stocks. As
described in the text, in the “true” definition of the household dynamic problem
the entire distribution Φt is an argument of the value function.We are now ready to formally define the equilibrium for this
economy.
Definition 3.1. A recursive competitive equilibrium is a value
function {V(xt;β)}t=0
∞ , policy functions {h(xt;β), b(xt;β), c(xt;β)}t=0
∞ for
each β, prices {Rt}t=0
∞ and {wt}t=0
∞ , aggregate variables Kt, Lt, and Ht
for each period t, and a law of motion F (K, H; A) such that:
1. Agents optimize: Given Rt, wt, and the law of motion F, the
value functions are solution to the individual’s problem, with the
corresponding policy functions;
2. Prices are determined competitively at any t:
3. Assets and Labour Markets clear at any t:
and as a consequence the goods market satisfies the resource
feasibility constraint (1).
4. The law of motion for aggregate capital, housing wealth and
labour is given by
Notice that individual labour supply is an intra-temporal
decision, and the first order conditions that characterize the optimal
l(xt;β) are the following:
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26Appendix A at the end provides the details on the computational
approach used to solve for the model equilibrium.
4. - Calibration
Our model period is assumed to be a year. We assume that
50 percent of households have a discount factor of 0.95, and 50
percent of households have a discount factor of 0.97. The high
discount factor pins the average real interest rate down to an
average value around 3 percent, as in the data. The low discount
factor is in the range of estimates in the literature, see for instance
Hendricks (2007) and references therein.
We set the capital share α = 0.33 and its depreciation rate δK
= 0.10. In all the economies we consider, these values yield average
capital to output ratios around 2.6 and average investment to
output ratios around 25% on an annual basis.
11
We set the weight on housing in the utility function j = 0.125,
and the depreciation rate for housing δH = 0.04. These values
yield average housing capital to output ratios of around 1.3 and
average housing investment to output ratios around 5% on an
annual basis. All these values are roughly in accordance with the
National Income and Product Accounts and the Fixed Assets
Tables.
We set τ = 1 and the total endowment of time l
–
= 2.06: these
two parameters imply that average time worked (around unity) is
slightly less than half the available time. As explained in King and
Rebelo (2000), this is equivalent to assuming a labour supply
elasticity of around unity.
The business cycles features that our model aims at
reproducing refer to the US economy. As is well known, the US
economy has experienced a substantial decline in the volatility of
most macroeconomic aggregates post 1980s, which makes it hard
to use a simple summary statistics for the entire post-world-war
An Equilibrium Model of Lumpy, etc. M. IACOVIELLO - M. PAVAN
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11 Our definition of output excludes the value of imputed rents on housing
services, which account for about 10% of GDP in the United States.II period. For this reason, the set of business cycle facts that our
model aims at explaining correspond to the US for the period
1985-2005. Our calibration of the aggregate shock is meant to
reproduce a standard deviation of output roughly in line with the
data for the period 1985-2005. For the aggregate productivity
shock At we use a Markov-chain specification with five states to
match the following first-order autoregressive representation for
the logarithm of total factor productivity
We set ρA = 0.90 and σA = 0.008.
In a similar vein, we specify the idiosyncratic labour efficiency
shock using a three-state Markov chain to match:
We  set  ρZ = 0.925 and σZ = 0.30. Our calibration of the
idiosyncratic shock is meant to proxy for a reasonable degree of
income uncertainty at the household level. The numbers we
choose are in line with several microeconometric studies (for
instance, see Aiyagari, 1994 and references therein).
Finally, we specify the maximum loan-to-value ratio m at 0.95.
5. - Solution
We  numerically solve for the model equilibrium using a
computational method similar to the one used in Krusell and
Smith (1998). The individual’s value and policy functions are
computed on grids of points for the state variables, and then
approximated with linear interpolation at points not on the grids.
See the Appendix for details. In the simulations we include 12,000
agents and 10,000 periods; we discard the first 200 periods.
Typically, starting from any initial wealth distribution (we choose
     log log ( ) , ( ,
/ zz N o r m a l tZ t Z Z t t =+ − − ρσ ρ ε ε 1
21 2 10 ∼ 1 1)
     log log ( ) , ( ,
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28one in which agents hold the same level of assets), the stationary
equilibrium is reached in about 100 model periods.
6. - Model Results
We now describe the main properties of our model. In order to
analyze how lumpy housing investment affects the economy busi-
ness cycle properties, we compare the following three economies:
1. Model A: In the baseline model, individuals can accumulate
and decumulate housing without paying any transaction cost.
Housing is fully liquid (ψ = 0).
2.  Model B: Adjustment of housing is free if net housing
investment does not exceed 3% of the beginning of period stock
(φh = 0.03), reflecting the assumption that renovations are a way
to adjust housing consumption by small amounts without
incurring in transaction costs. Otherwise, each household pays a
3 percent transaction cost proportional to the value of the initial
stock (ψ = 0.03).
3.  Model C: Any adjustment of housing incurs a 3 percent
transaction cost proportional to the value of the initial stock (φh
= 0, ψ = 0.03).
It is obvious that, in moving from model A to model C, housing
becomes more and more illiquid. Individual simulations for 25
period/years are shown in Graph 1. The figure plots financial
liabilities (bi), housing stock (hi), consumption (ci) and labour
income (labinci) of a randomly chosen patient agent that we follow
for about 25 periods. This agent starts with borrowing around 1
and housing holdings around (depending on the model) 1.5, so
that the borrowing constraint (which allows to borrow up to 95
percent of the value of the house) is not initially binding.
12 Initially,
individual income is around average, and it rises in period 5, thus
leading to a drop in borrowing and a rise in housing and non-
An Equilibrium Model of Lumpy, etc. M. IACOVIELLO - M. PAVAN
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12 The first period that we plot in the Graph does not coincide with the first
period in the simulation: for this reason, the holdings of b and h are not necessarily
identical across the three models in the first period plotted.housing consumption. In period 8, however, the agent is hit by a
negative idiosyncratic income shock that persists for a while. In
the model without housing adjustment costs (model A), the agent
finds it optimal to reduce consumption, housing and non-housing
wealth: in particular, the adjustment in housing is large and
immediate. In the models when housing can be adjusted only at
some cost, most of the adjustment falls on consumption: if
housing can be adjusted only within the 3% band, the adjustment
is slow and gradual (model B); if all adjustments are costly, the
agent reduces its housing consumption only after the bad shock
has persisted for a sufficiently long time (model C): in the case of
model C, the agent hits the borrowing constraint around period
22, and is forced to cut back on housing and borrowing at the
same time, so his consumption drops substantially.
The same logic applies to aggregate shocks as well. The main
difference is that aggregate shocks (being common to every agent)
also impact on the equilibrium interest rate, and that aggregate
shocks are also smaller in their average size. Graph 2 plots the







































51 0 1 52 02 5 51 0 1 52 02 5main macro variables (expressed as a ratio to their long-run,
steady state model average, denoted with the ss subscript) for a
typical simulation that lasts for 25 periods: here, the economy
experiences a prolonged expansion which lasts until around period
17 (total GDP is about 2% above its mean during the expansion).
As housing becomes costlier to adjust (that is, as we move from
model A to model C), the stocks of housing and business capital
are smoother and less volatile, whereas consumption becomes
slightly more volatile.
In Tables 1 and 2 we summarize the quantitative differences
across the three models that we compare, and we relate them to
their data counterparts. Table 1 presents the statistics computed
from the US data for the period 1985-2005. As the data Table shows,
investment (consumption) is more (less) volatile than GDP. Three
interesting properties of housing investment are that (1) housing
investment is procyclical; (2) housing investment leads GDP; (3)
housing investment is more volatile than business investment.

















































51 0 1 52 02 5 51 0 1 52 02 5Table 2 displays the baseline properties (standard deviation
and cross-correlation of aggregate output) of the three models.
In all the models, as in the US data, consumption, business
investment and housing investment are procyclical. Aggregate
consumption is smoother than aggregate output: its relative
standard deviation is around 0.8. As in many incomplete markets
models, individual consumption is more volatile than aggregate
consumption. For instance, the standard deviation of the
individual consumption growth rate is around 0.10, a number
which is much higher than what a complete markets model would
predict. Using the Consumption Expenditure Survey data, Bray,
Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) find that the standard deviation
of quarterly consumption growth is about 0.063 for households
with positive assets. If quarterly consumption growth is i.i.d., this
corresponds to a standard deviation of annual consumption
growth of 0.126. In addition, the standard deviation of individual
consumption growth is less than half the standard deviation of
individual income growth (0.23).
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TABLE 1
CYCLICAL STATISTICS OF THE US ECONOMY 1984-2005
Variable sd% sd/sd(Y) correlation of Y w/
x(t–1)  xx (t+1)
GDP 1.21 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.92
C 0.77 0.63 0.82 0.94 0.86
IH 5.03 4.16 0.71 0.64 0.48
IK 4.22 3.48 0.76 0.85 0.84






Source: BUDRÍA S. et AL., 2002.We  conclude this section by remarking the success of our
model in matching important elements of the wealth distribution
in the data. Graph 3 shows the Lorenz curves for total wealth (the
sum of housing and net financial assets) in model C and the data.
13
An Equilibrium Model of Lumpy, etc. M. IACOVIELLO - M. PAVAN
33
TABLE 2
PROPERTIES OF THE MODEL
Model A Model B Model C
No AC 3% band, no AC 3% AC
St.dev. GDP 1.21 1.19 1.16
St.dev. C 0.93 0.96 1.05
St.dev. IH 9.87 3.18 2.17
St.dev. IK 2.68 2.01 2.02
St.dev. Hours 0.23 0.2 0.21
St.dev. Debt 1.19 0.59 1
Corr C, GDP 0.95 0.95 0.94
Corr IK, GDP 0.65 0.88 0.91
Corr Hours, GDP 0.74 0.68 0.41
Corr Debt, GDP 0.27 –0.01 –0.04
Corr IH, IK –0.45 0.3 0.47
Corr IH, GDP(–1) 0.57 0.81 0.72
Corr IH, GDP 0.31 0.61 0.68
Corr IH, GDP(+1) 0.22 0.54 0.62
Average Debt/Y 0.59 0.56 0.57
Std (∆ log ci) 0.103 0.105 0.106
Std (∆ log wli) 0.23 0.23 0.23
Gini Wealth  0.66 0.66 0.67
Gini Consumption  0.15 0.15 0.15
Gini Labor Income  0.22 0.22 0.22
Average GDP 1.6107 1.6112 1.6143
Average K 4.1251 4.1288 4.1401
Average H 2.0612 2.0419 2.0555
Average Wealth  6.1863 6.1707 6.1956
Note: Results with unfiltered variables. (Similar results obtain using HP-filter for
the model variables).
13 We choose model C because model C is the pure lumpiness model and has
some microeconomic appeal. However, the wealth distributions implied by model
C were nearly identical to those of model A and model B, thus suggesting that the
main differences across models have to do with their business cycle properties,
rather than their implied properties for the distribution of wealth.In our model economy, small differences in the discount factors
imply that impatient agents (who are 50 percent of the population)
end up accumulating very little wealth besides the required down
payment in their home, so they hold close to zero wealth; as a
consequence, patient agents hold lots of the wealth in the
economy, although bad and persistent income shocks can force
some of them to hold very small amounts of it. As in the data, 60
percent of the population holds less than 10 percent of total
wealth, although our model overpredicts the share of wealth held
by the second quintile. As a consequence, the Gini coefficient for
total wealth in our models is slightly less than in the data (0.67
against 0.80). Not reported in the figure, both in our model and
in the data the distribution of total wealth is more skewed than
the distribution of housing wealth, although our model predicts
that housing wealth is much less concentrated than in the data
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GRAPH 3
LORENZ CURVES FOR WEALTH HOLDINGS, MODEL C AND DATA












Wealth distribution, model C
Wealth distribution, data
45 line
Fraction of Population(the Gini coefficient for housing wealth is 0.2 in the model, against
0.6 in the data).
14
In all models, it is possible to construct a measure of aggregate
mortgage debt by integrating across the negative positions of all
indebted agents: this variable amounts to about 60 percent of GDP
in all the economies we consider. A large fraction of this debt
(about 90 percent) is held by the impatient agents: in this sense,
impatient agents are an important element of the model since they
allow reproducing the distribution and the composition of
aggregate wealth better than models based on agents who are ex-
ante identical.
15
Volatility of Aggregate Housing Investment. In model A agents
smooth their consumption over time by freely adjusting both their
housing stock and their financial assets. Housing and non-housing
capital are very close substitutes, because they both offer the
individual an instrument to smooth consumption over time, and
do not differ in their degree of liquidity.
When housing becomes more costly to adjust, agents do not
change their housing position often, but smooth consumption
through buying and selling the financial asset (of which they now
need to keep a higher stock). Obviously, this behaviour is more
pronounced in model C relative to model B. Therefore, in terms
of volatility of aggregate housing investment, model A is the one
that delivers the largest volatility (equal to about 8 times that of
GDP), followed by model B (2.7) and model C (1.9).
Intuitively, this result is not surprising, since it is standard
extension of partial equilibrium reasoning applied to a general
equilibrium model. However, the result stands in sharp contrast
with some of the literature that models non-convex costs of
investment on the side of the firm, and finds that large and
infrequent adjustment of capital on the firm side has no effect on
the behaviour of aggregate variables (as in the work of Aubhik
Khan and Julia Thomas). Our intuition for the main difference
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14 The Gini coefficients for total wealth and housing wealth in the data were
based on the studies of BUDRÍA S.  et AL. (2002) and DIAZ A. - LUENGO-PRADO M.
(2006) respectively.
15 A similar point is also made by HENDRICKS L. (2007).between this literature and our results goes as follows: when
capital adjustment costs are paid by the firm, adjustments in
prices work in a way to smooth household consumption in spite
of large lumpiness in investment at the firm; instead, in our case,
when adjustment costs are paid by the household, fluctuations in
prices are not sufficient to restore smooth aggregate consumption
profiles, so that the macroeconomic aggregates do depend on
lumpy housing investment.
16
Another interesting property of models B and  C is that the
volatility of housing investment goes hand in hand with the
volatility of fixed investment. Since buying and selling housing
more frequently entails a higher level of financial activity, lower
housing adjustment costs imply higher volatility both of housing
investment and of business investment.
Volatility of Other Aggregates.  Model A delivers the largest
volatility of housing investment, but delivers the smoothest profile
for aggregate consumption. The relative standard deviation of
aggregate consumption computed in model A is 0.77, while models
B and  C predict values of 0.81 and 0.91 for the same variable,
respectively. In the first model, by trading housing frequently,
individuals manage to keep a smoother profile of non-durable
consumption. More liquid durable assets are effectively used as a
means to self-insure against idiosyncratic risk.
How Often Do People Move? Model A predicts a considerable
amount of volatility in housing investment, both at the macro level
(the volatility of housing investment exceeds its data counterpart by
a factor of two) and at the micro level: without adjustment costs,
individuals change their housing position every model period.
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16 Citing from Khan and Thomas (in the New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, forthcoming): «THOMAS J.M. (2002) and KHAN A. and THOMAS J.M.
(2003; 2007) show that the target capital(s) selected by firms facing non-convex
costs exhibit changes an order of magnitude smaller in general equilibrium.
Because large movements in target capital, and hence in aggregate investment
demand, would imply intolerable consumption volatility for households (at least
in the closed-economy settings examined in these studies), they do not occur in
equilibrium. Instead, small changes in relative prices serve to discourage sharp
changes in optimal capital, thereby preventing large synchronizations in firms’
investment timing and leaving the aggregate series largely unaffected by the
microeconomic lumpiness caused by non-convex adjustment costs».Model B requires households to pay the adjustment cost for
every adjustment of the stock larger than 3 percent. With an
adjustment cost equivalent to 3 percent of the housing stock (roughly
5 percent of annual labour income), individuals are reluctant to
change their housing stock too much too quickly: housing is illiquid,
but not very volatile. On average, individuals pay the adjustment cost
for large changes only rarely. If paying the adjustment cost
corresponds to moving, they do so once every 51 years. As a fraction
of total residential investment, aggregate transaction costs (Ω (Ht,
Ht–1) in equation 1) — the model counterpart to the empirical
brokers’ commissions — are slightly less than 1 percent, as opposed
to 10/15 percent in the data, as we reviewed in Section 2.
Model C (the pure lumpy model) predicts that people “move”
every 13 years. This number is slightly lower than in the data (in
the US, people move on average every 5 to 7 years), but our model
abstracts from life-cycle effects, divorce and job reallocation, which
can all cause people to move. Along this strictly microeconomic
dimension, model C is the one that fits the data best. Model C also
fits the data well in that it predicts a non-negligible share of
residential investment that can be counted as transaction costs:
aggregate transaction costs amount in fact to 4 percent of residential
investment, although they are slightly countercyclical; the model
predicts that people are more likely to move in a recession, since
binding borrowing constraints force them to liquidate their home to
keep servicing their debt: this is slightly at odds with the data, that
typically show that housing sales and transactions are procyclical.
Cyclical Properties of Housing Investment. All the models
replicate the positive correlation between housing investment and
aggregate economic activity, although the correlation varies
substantially across models.
The model without adjustment costs (model A) is the one that
features the smallest correlation between housing investment and
GDP: we also note that this model delivers very similar properties
to its representative agent counterpart, where we assume two types
of agents as well as borrowing constraints that are always binding
for the impatient agents, always non-binding for the patient. In
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0.31, and is substantially lower than its data counterpart of 0.64.
Another property of the model without housing adjustment costs
is that it delivers a negative correlation between household and
business investment, with a value of –0.46. This result stems from
the fact that housing and non-housing capital are very close
substitutes from the household perspective, and is a well known
result in the household production literature: see for instance the
discussion in Fisher (2007). Another characteristic of this model
is that housing investment lags the business cycle, unlike in the
data: intuitively, this happens because individuals prefer to
accumulate non-housing capital faster and earlier when
productivity improves, and build up homes only later.
17
The model with a 3% band for the adjustment cost (Model B)
features more procyclical residential investment. The contempo-
raneous correlation between housing investment and GDP is 0.61,
although housing still lags GDP. However, the model matches well
the positive correlation between housing and business investment,
a value of 0.31 (in the data that we use for Table 1, this correla-
tion — not reported in the Table — is 0.27).
A similar pattern emerges in the pure lumpy model: the
contemporaneous correlation between housing and business
investment is 0.50, although — again — housing investment tends
to lag GDP (there is a higher correlation between current GDP
and future housing investment than vice versa).
7. - Conclusions
In this paper we have posed a simple question: how does the
microeconomic lumpiness of housing adjustment affect the
equilibrium dynamic properties of aggregate consumption and
investment? Our main conclusion is that lumpiness matters: in
particular, we have shown that lumpiness in housing adjustment
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17 See again FISHER J. (2007) for a recent discussion of these issues in the
context of a representative agent model.(1) reduces the volatility of both household and business
investment; (2) increases the volatility of aggregate consumption;
(3) increases the correlation of housing investment with business
investment and with GDP. We have also noted that lumpiness of
investment activity at the household level has significant aggregate
implications, in contrast with the literature that shows that the
aggregate effects of lumpy investment at the firm level are
negligible.
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Computational Details
We  numerically solve for the model equilibrium using a
computational method similar to the one used in Krusell and
Smith (1998). The value and policy functions are computed on
grids of points for the state variables, and then approximated with
linear interpolation at points not on the grids. The algorithm
consists of the following steps:
1. Specify grids for the state space of individual and aggregate
state variables.
As a result of robustness checks, the number of grid points
was chosen as follows: 5 points for the aggregate shock, 3 values
for the idiosyncratic shock, 60 points for the housing stock, and
550 points for the financial asset. For aggregate variables, we
choose a grid of respectively 7 and 3 equally spaced points in the
range [0.9K*, 1.1K*] and [0.9H*, 1.1H*] , where K* and H* denote
the steady state aggregate capital and housing stock respectively.
2. Guess initial coefficients {w
A
is}A∈A ˜ ,i=0,..,2,s∈{K,H,L} for the linear
functions that approximate the laws of motion of aggregate
capital, durables and labour:
3. Use value function iteration in combination with Howard
algorithm to compute optimal policies as a function of the
individual and aggregate states.
18 Notice that the intra-temporal
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18 In computation, we exploit the strict concavity of the value function in the
choice for assets as well as the monotonicity of the policy function in assets (given
any choice for the durable good).optimal value for labour hours as a function of consumption and
productivity shock is the following:
which allows one to derive consumption directly from the budget
constraint as follows:
and to write the per-period utility function as
As a consequence, the individual dynamic optimization
problem entails solving for policy functions for b and h only.
For lt = 0, we have
In practice, we prevent individuals from choosing zero hours.
4. Draw a series of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, and
use the (approximated) policy functions and the predicted
aggregate variables to simulate the optimal decisions of a large
number of agents for many periods. We simulate 12,000
individuals for 10,000 periods, discarding the first 200.
19 Compute
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19 We “enforced” the law of large numbers by making sure that the simulated
fractions of labour productivity shocks corresponded to the theoretical ones, by
randomly adjusting the values of the shocks.5. Run a regression of the simulated aggregate capital,
durables and labour on past aggregate variables K and  H,
retrieving the new coefficients {w
A
is} for the law of motion for Ht,
Lt and  Kt. We repeat steps 3 and 4 until convergence over the
coefficients of the regressions. We measure goodness of fit using
the R - squared of the regressions (which are always equal to 0.999
or higher at convergence).
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Data Construction
— Consumption (C): Real Personal Consumption Expenditure.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Available at:
http: //research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/PCECC96.txt
— Residential Investment (IH): Real Private Residential Fixed
Investment. Source: BEA. Available at:
http: //research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/PRFIC96.txt
— Business Investment (IK): Real Private Non-residential
Fixed Investment. Source: BEA. Available at:
http: //research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/PNFIC96.txt
— GDP: Defined as C + IH +IK
Household debt (DEBT): Households (end of period,
outstanding) home mortgage debt deflated with the BLS implicit
price deflator for the non-farm business sector. Data are from the
Flow of Funds Z1 release. The series code for mortgage debt is
LA153165105.
The deflator can be found at http: //research.stlouisfed.org/
fred2/data/IPDNBS.txt
All data series are quarterly and detrended with an HP filter
with λ = 1600.
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